IN-BETWEEN THE OTHER AND THE THING
EMBEDDING ARCHITECTURAL EDUCATION IN AN ETHICAL DISPOSITION

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Abstract
Whereas traditionally proper conduct on the part of the architect implied loyalty to a patron and to a craft-guild, in Modernism ethics came to constitute a major component of the normative approach of architecture towards form and design principles. Since the 1960s, this approach has been severely criticized for its contents. However, the conviction that architecture needs an ethical backbone has persisted unequivocally.

This paper suggests that prior to form and design principles, which necessarily vary in place and time, an ethical disposition should be cultivated that relates architecture to a larger sense of life.

The paper outlines a platform for such an ethically oriented architectural disposition, rooted in the triple cornerstone of “I”, “The Other” and “Thing” - major phenomenological concepts in the writings of Husserl, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. Although these universal concepts are ultimately irreconcilable, they are strongly recommended as part of architectural education precisely because architectural acts are so particular and specific.

Nobel laureate Herbert A. Simon, whose research focused on the nature of intelligence, problem-solving and decision making, classified architecture as one of the “sciences of the artificial,” centered on the intentional action of design (Simon, 1969).

Architecture, unlike science, is not about the world but involved in the world, intending to transform it through projects grounded in intentions, ends, and values (d’Anjou, 2004:211). As such, architecture necessarily embodies an ethical dimension, a nexus of ethics that is embedded in architecture (Wasserman et al., Spector, 2001; Ray 2005)

The nexus has a history (Bell, 1990:25) and a current situation, and it is against the backdrop of this current situation that this paper aims to outline an ethical platform for architectural education.

keywords
ethical-disposition, I-other relation, I-thing relation.

The Story of Architectural Ethics in a Nutshell

Vitruvius, the Roman architect and writer, endowed Western architecture with three basic qualities: “firmitas, utilitas, venustas” (translated by later generations respectively as durability / solidity / stability; functionality / usefulness / appropriateness / practicality; beauty / grace / delight). The architect’s responsibility was to ensure realization of the three virtues in his
projects, on behalf of his patron. Architectural ethics was tacitly included in the domain of appropriate knowledge (as competence, as “theoretical” knowledge, and as acquaintance with precedents), and in the contractual relation of architect and client. Vitruvius inspired Renaissance theorists of architecture, such as Alberti, Serlio, Pacioli and Palladio, and through them succeeding generations through the Modern age. While interpretations of “finitas, utilitas, venustas” metamorphosed, the virtues themselves persisted. Thus, for an architect, being professionally ethically entailed production of good architecture, namely the actualization of trusted professional knowledge.

In addition, and especially with the resurgence of city life in the eleventh century and the flourishing of craft-guilds, conforming to the rules of the professional organization was also part of ethical conduct. Alongside obedience to the guild hierarchy and compliance with well-formulated rules about quality control and regulation of work, this included the training of apprentices and social undertakings, such as assuring financial security for widowers and orphans (Gelerenter, 1995).

Ethics and morals were explicitly brought into the normative discourse of architectural form and creative procedures only with the Gothic Revival in the nineteenth century. In England, Pugin advocated the Gothic style as the true Christian form of architecture, together with a return to the morally ideal medieval society. Ruskin, in his “Seven Lamps of Architecture,” argued that architecture could not be separated from morality, also referring to Middle-Ages craftsmanship, “true nature of material,” and anti-modernization. For Viollet-le-Duc, in France, the essence of Gothic style was rational construction. He promoted “honesty” in architecture, which eventually transcended all revival styles, to inform the moving spirit of Modernism. In the light of positivistic reason, and with harsh criticism of past preoccupation with styles, Durand proclaimed that building ought to be solid, healthy, and economical, without decoration. This last idea reached its culmination in “Ornament and Crime,” the effective 1908 article by the Viennese Adolf Loos. Still, as early as the mid-nineteenth century, architecture came to incorporate ethics in the widest social sense, as expressed in an important editorial just after the 1848 “the great instrument of all reform is first and foremost architecture” (Collins, 1965:110).

When Le Corbusier, the most influential of Modernist architects popularized the notion of the new spirit - l’Esprit Nouveau in the 1920s, he also referred to the idea that “architecture is essentially an instrument of social reform” (Collins, 1965:110). In the same vein and adopting a Hegelian interpretation of history, major theoreticians and historians of the time shed light on Modernist creative procedures and “no-style” forms as both the moral and the inevitable expression of contemporaneous Zeitgeist (Pevsner, 1960 [1936]; Giedion, 1949; Hitchcock, 1932). Aphorisms such as “Form Follows Function” (Sullivan), “Less is more” (Mies van der Rohe), “Architecture or revolution” (Le Corbusier), “Clear slate” (i.e. rejection of all former styles), and “Honesty of expression” accompanied abstract aesthetics, innovative technology, and mass production, based on rational and scientific thought and laden with moral overtones.
Modernism included the conviction that through its approach and aesthetic preferences it was fulfilling the ethical function of creating a better future for all humanity, regardless of place, worldview, class etc. It reached its most extensive implementation in the two decades after the Second World War, and at the same time lost its credibility. (Banham, 1975:4) Criticism of modernism was heralded by Venturi (Venturi, 1966), who showed the fallacies of Modernist architectural ideology on its own grounds: Modernism was a style. He relegated reformative rhetoric and mass production aesthetics in favor of individual freedom as the highest value; implicitly legitimizing mass consumerism as the broader context of architectural production. Historiography declared the arrival of Postmodernism, and the re-legitimization of all that was banished by Modernism. (Jencks, 1977; Portoghesi, 1983) In parallel, cultural theory and poststructuralist philosophy took over the scene of architectural discourse, showing how the architectural object, regardless of its style, was morally inert, but prone to infusion with ideology, according to changing political agendas. Far from ensuring social justice, Modernism was unmasked as a tool for manipulation in the interest of power in everyday life in the West, and even more so under Colonialism. Architects, and not Modernists alone, were exposed as complying with hegemony and their broader moral professional conviction trodden to dust. (e.g.Bataille, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991; Hayden, 1995; Alsayyad, 1992; Hirst, 1992) In the same vein, architectural education in the second half of the twentieth century was criticized for encouraging students to focus on form and aesthetics at the expense of ethics and social justice (Crawford, 1999). No specific form was questioned, but the very preoccupation with form.

This situation was summarized by Juhani Pallasmaa (1994):

“The view of the world and the mission of architecture that had appeared unquestionably grounded in concepts of truth and ethics, as well as in a social vision and commitment, has shattered, and the sense of purpose and order has faded away.”

**Setting the Question of Architectural Ethics in Architectural Education**

Disappointment, as expressed in the above-mentioned quote, is only possible against the backdrop of the conceived function of architecture, as expressed by David Harvey, leading social theorist of international standing: The architect shapes spaces so as to give them social utility as well as human and aesthetic/symbolic meanings. The architect shapes and preserves long-term social memories and strives to give material form to the longings and desires of individuals and collectivities. The architect struggles to open spaces for new possibilities, for future forms of social life. (Harvey, 2000:200)

Indeed, the slogan of the Venice 2000 Biennale of Architecture was “Less Aesthetics More Ethics,” hailing engagement with the enormous social, economic, and ecological challenges confronting the globalizing world (Città, 2000), albeit more of an intended agenda for the future than an exemplification of precedents. Thus, the conviction of the necessity of change towards higher architectural ethics exists. The question is what should constitute such a change and how it could be accomplished. The possibilities seem to be: legislation, professional code, normative theory of architecture, and
a larger, basic, professional sense of life. The present paper will advocate the latter. Ensuring good architectural artifacts and correct design conduct, through legislation and a professional codes of ethics, are certainly important fields of endeavor. These have been undertaken for centuries, and require updating and reworking according to changing ethos and more so, according to emerging practical needs. The first modern National Building Code of the U.S., for example, was published in 1905 by an association of fire insurance companies (Snyder and Cantanese, 1979).

Indeed, laws follow advances in technology and wider socio-cultural and economic considerations, albeit with considerable delay and in a rather restricted manner. For example: The Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating System is a recent phenomenon, while ideas of environmental sustainability have been strongly advanced in American architectural discourse since the 1973 OPEC oil crisis. Legislation is the most forceful means to ensure realization of norms, but it lags in time, is restricted in scope and of necessity, expresses the interest of ruling powers.

Professional codes have been criticized for other limitations, especially for being pragmatic, self-serving and the intention of preserving the social privileges of the profession (Bourdieu, 1977). As opposed to that, examination of the 2004 Code of Ethics & Professional Conduct, AIA - The American Institute of Architects, for example, does reveal a clear reference to broader values. The code mentions conservation of natural and cultural heritage and environmental sustainability (E.S. 1.2. and E.S. 1.3.) because they are leading social ideals, and because they are clearly, though not exclusively, related to architecture. Still, it would be difficult to assert when an E.S. (Ethical Standard) is violated, and in any case - no disciplinary action is prone to follow, the less so any legal prosecution.

Such ideals may be promoted politically and re-enacted in architectural practice through legislation, civic campaigns or other democratic undertakings, eventually being wholly or partially reformulated into laws. They may however also be intrinsic to architecture as such, and hence definitive of it. After all, as acknowledged in the AIA 2004 Code: “Often, only one architect can recognize that the behavior of another architect poses a serious question as to the other’s professional integrity” (commentary to E.S. 4.2 Dignity and Integrity). Thus, the most important place to plant architectural ethics would be the individual architect. For ethically inclined architects, ethical work would be a primal component of any professional action. Architects would have absorbed ethical principles so fully that they would cease to think about principles (Ballantyne, 2005). In an Aristotelian formulation: “Virtue (arête) then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions” (Book II, Ch. 6). It is a state acquired through habitual application over time, a level beyond mere competency, a state of excellence. An ethical disposition may be acquired during the architect’s professional education, which involves the reconstruction of knowledge, beliefs, and identity (Austelitz and Aravot, 2007; Kolb, 1984). Students are exposed to architectural education in their early twenties - significantly the highest, post-conventional level of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. At this age the individual is concerned with...
societal issues, with providing the greatest good to the greatest number of people, with universal principles and conscience (Kohlberg, 1981 in Magun-Jackson, 2004:221). Indeed, professional architectural education has always been interwoven with values, both explicitly and tacitly. This paper proposes adding an explicitly ethical platform into the curriculum of architectural education (not to be confused with the study of law or professional code).

**In Pursuit of a Phenomenological Approach**

In contrast to Modernism and other normative theories, this ethical platform will outline a disposition to be activated in specific circumstances, rather than general principles of form or design. The latter would inevitably be critically deconstructed, regardless of seemingly appropriateness as design principles. Such, for example, the approach of “critical regionalism” (Frampton, 1983), was exposed as a product of precisely the same forces it sought to overcome, rather than architectural resistance to global capitalism. (Jameson, 1983).

A more basic approach is needed, one between ontology and ethics, “A larger sense of life to which the architect positively contributes” (Skolimowski, 1993:496). For Vitruvius and the following long tradition, such a larger sense of life, was the view of all arts as imitation of nature. In Modernism it was the underlying belief in progressive science and technology. (Perez-Gomez, 1983)

Some thinkers refer to sustainability as providing the platform for architectural ethics (e.g. Skolimowski, 1981; McDonough & Braungart, 1992; Scott, 1998; Kibert, 2005; Feireiss & Feireiss, 2008). This wide set of principles, interpreted as the “triple-e” - “environment, (social) equity and economy,” is vital for our future, with many environmental aspects already being legally incorporated throughout the world. However, it transforms architectural making into a service based on scientific research. It should be emphasized that some scholars advocate precisely such a position (e.g. Agrest, 1991; Bell, 2004)Heidegger’s “dwelling” (Heidegger, 1971) is an additional concept that provides the desired “larger sense of life.” It was of the utmost influence in the 1970s and 1980s (Norberg-Schulz, 1979), and was directly connected to architectural ethics in the late 1990s (Hamers, 1997). While providing one of the most basic interpretations of architectural making, it is currently suspected of sentimentality and generalization (Leach, 2005:135-142). Dwelling is undergoing re-interpretation, and its profound kernel is once again being integrated into contemporary, manifold, architectural thought. (Vesely, 2007).

Dwelling and sustainability do not exclude each other; on the contrary, they hold much in common, and are actually included in architectural education programs. The ethical platform proposed below pre-supposes this inclusion, but it seeks a different sort of counterparts. In standard terminology, dwelling and sustainability are teleologically oriented, whereas the desired platform is deontologically oriented. Following Ricoeur (1992), these orientations are complementary, not incompatible.

For these deontological counterparts, we turn, therefore, to phenomenology. There are
several reasons for this turn: Phenomenology is the study of our experience — how we experience. Since more than anything else, architectural making is directed towards its experience by users, from sensing to perception and from remembrance to interpretation, the search in phenomenological writings for additional counterparts for the architectural platform is very close and. (Dwelling is a major phenomenological concept.) Furthermore, the phenomenological method, which focuses on conscious experience from a first-person point of view, is very much the method applied in architectural practice and the one tacitly forwarded as part of architectural education. Even architects unaware of phenomenology as a discipline of philosophy practice its method as procedural knowledge or know-how. (Aravot, 2008)

Finally, phenomenology is both a critical and a humane field of thought and research, and therefore a most appropriate starting point for the architect’s creative task of reconstructing and reconstituting the already structured and constituted worlds of other people. (After Ricoeur, in Keamey 1996:149).

Precis of the Essence of Ethics in Architecture

Beyond professional integrity, which precedes all other premises, there are several premises as to the essence of a platform for architectural ethics that can guide us in the exploration of phenomenological writers:

First, ethics is a relationship between oneself and an “other.” Second, ethical relationships are rooted in responsibility. Third, responsibility is dependent on a conscious “I,” able to exercise free decision-making. This is not to imply that architectural making (poetics) is led only by conscious decisions, on the contrary: poetics is led by rich pre-reflective components. An ethical act, however, is not “simply the outcome of happenstance, a mere whim, or a blind insistence. At the core of ethics, one might argue, is an imperative within an imperative. Not only ought one act for the good; one ought also to become insightful about the reason for that action” (Hatley, 2006:2). Fourth, “I” and “other” are capable of achieving mutual understanding to a considerable degree. Fifth, for an “I” to become an architectural “I” a profound mode of contextual responsiveness is required. Sixth, this responsiveness includes the inanimate architectural artifact. The emphasis on an architectural “I” and its relationship to the “other” is laid in contrast to the current tendency of the individual’s responsibility to dissolve into a larger, abstract architectural corporation (excluding “starchitects”). The stress on contextual responsiveness opposes the trend of “post-critical architecture,” which locates the ideal of architecture in business management practices (e.g. Speaks, 2002; Roemer van Toorn, 2007), detaching architectural production from meaning and context. Ethical business issues are concerned with financial, power, or image gains of the corporation or firm, whereas the ethical platform hereby pursued emerges from the opposite humane pole. Phenomenological references that shed light on the sought-after essence are: Edmond Husserl’s “intentionality” and “intersubjectivity”; Maurice Merleau Ponty’s “flesh”; and Emmanuel Levinas’s “face of the other.”
**Intentionality and Intersubjectivity**

On the premise that an ethical act is, by definition, an intentional act and not an inevitable natural occurrence, ethical acts cannot be expected from anybody regarding him/herself as a mere victim of circumstances, or as an ideological fiction. For an ethical disposition in architecture, an “I” must be reinstated with the ability to intend architectural making and, at the same time, to critically exercise ethical intentionality within his/her life/world. Husserl’s concept of intentionality had of course a very different focus. For present concern the value lays in the significance of intentionality as subject-object (thing) relationship.

For architectural ethics, intentionality reassures the self as a part of the world: plural streams of consciousness become one subjective and identified “I” through its affinity to the body, one body. In The Crisis of the European Sciences (Husserl, 1970) the ideal essences revealed to the “I” give way to historically shared kernels, and intersubjectivity is explained as historical. “In our continually streaming perception of the world, we are not isolated but rather stand within it in contact with other men. In living with one another, each can participate in the life of the other” (in Keamey, 1994:23) Thus, Husserl’s intentionality and intersubjectivity are concepts that reinstate the “I”-- connecting the “I” with the world of things and with other selves, and assuring a foothold for the creative “I” in that which is different from oneself. Ontology of Flesh The Ontology of Flesh is called upon because architecture, according to the disposition sought here, is poiesis: the making of things, objects, matter, the tangible, the sensible, and the perceived. These, so it is hereby proposed, should be assigned primary importance in a lived world of historicity, contingencies, and inconsistencies. The sought-after architectural disposition should overcome the convention of conceiving of ourselves primarily as minds in our head that examine the world of objects as “mere” phenomena.

Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the lived body--the ontological primacy of phenomena and the epistemological primacy of perception, forms the counterpart of the desired platform that involves reaching out to the world. In his writings, perception is not merely a mental activity that uses the body as tool or agent. Mind, body, and world are inseparable. Perception is always active, embodied and generative of meaning. Merleau-Ponty uses the terms flesh, chiasm, reversibility, and intertwining to overcome the subject-object dualism prevailing in Western philosophical and scientific thought, by turning to a primordial realm which precedes objectivity and subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). Intertwining and chiasm refer to the same concept: subjective experience and objective existence as intertwined. Chiasm, however, does not imply synthesis. The moment of intertwining is followed by the “I” who posits himself in opposition to the other and to the world. This positioning is only possible due to the former moment of flesh. At the moment of flesh there is reversibility. The relationship between the hands is reversible: the hand that touches can be felt as touched, and vice versa, though never both at the same time, and it is this “reversibility” that Merleau Ponty picks out as the essence of flesh (Merleau Ponty, 1968:251).

Perception, Merleau Ponty writes, is the “art of interrogating [the thing] according to its own wishes” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:133). In a nutshell
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- this is what architecture is about. Face of the Other
In the present essay, an ethical relationship is premised on responsibility towards the other. This presupposition, which can readily be accepted by architectural Modernists, receives a very different interpretation in Levinas. While the former would imply beneficence entirely extended from the “I” towards the other, even in spite of the other, for Levinas responsibility is the ultimate respect of the other; an “other” that can never be reduced to a concept “I” might have; another “I” who I can never entirely know. Levinas’s first major book Totality and Infinity (1961) was subtitled “An Essay on Exteriority.” Levinas refers to the human other as “Autrui,” which is different from “autre.” “Autre” is any-thing other, part of my world, the “I”’s intentionality. “Autrui” is the human other with whom ethical relations are possible precisely because his alterity is transcendent. His being as exterior is named by Levinas “face” or “appeal.” When one “I” encounters the other, my “I” is exposed to his exposure, unable to resist his approach; my “I” becomes “hostage” to the other. This encounter is a performance, an approach, an addressing, an act that cannot be captured in propositional description. Hence the potential for non-propositional expressions as ethical acts including (so this paper proposes) architectural acts. Thus, in Levinas there is an “I” that is revealed to itself as responsive to the other, as completely surrendering to the other. There is hardly any ethical “I” more extreme in her/his relationship to the other than this.

Shared Aspects and Profound Differences
There are important shared aspects within the chosen phenomenological texts: All three philosophers write from an approach rooted in a phenomenology of the body. All three acknowledge the centrality of lived experience, of the immediacy of everyday-life, prior to the constitution of subject--object differentiation. All three retain the idea of subjectivity. These perspectives are essential to ground the ethical disposition of architecture. There are however, profound differences among any two of the three philosophers (Figure 1).

Merleau Ponty and Husserl: In Husserl’s early writing there is a quest to disclose suppositionless, ultimate truths - absolutely certain essences. For Merleau-Ponty this approach is unacceptable. Husserl’s subject is a thinking subject, whereas Merleau-Ponty’s is a bodily able being: not “I think” but “I can.” He reinterprets Husserl so that essences are always bound to the life-world of their origin, to temporality, and always based on pre-suppositions. This is much more in accord with Husserl’s later writing, which described subjective consciousness as inseparable from a life-world of existential communication within an intersubjective community.

Husserl’s “zu den Sachen selbst,” (Husserl, 1973) the experience as prior to separation between subject and object, finds its parallel in “le monde vécu” (Merleau Ponty, 2005). Man and world in Husserl’s writing are “in relation” - i.e. intentionality itself - in a mode reminiscent of flesh, intertwined prior to division by reflection and logic. Thus, Husserl’s later epistemology and Merleau-Ponty’s ontology could form counterparts of one and the same disposition. A Levinasian counterpart is however, impossible without inclusion of inner contradictions within the disposition itself. Levinas and Husserl--Levinas sees intentionality as a horizon of possibilities, which one unfolds around oneself. Anyone or anything meaningful that appears to
the “I” necessarily conforms to this horizon. This enclosing horizon ends up in stripping things of their reality, in assimilation of other people, in the impossibility of acknowledging the novelty of the present.

There is a huge, unbridgeable gap between Levinas and Husserl, which is perhaps best expressed when Levinas clarifies that the other is not a phenomenon at all but an enigma (Basic Philosophical Writings, 1965). “The other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign” (Levinas, 1969:194). Despite the best of a subject’s intentions, his deepest empathy and utmost generosity - the other cannot appear within the horizon of the subject’s intentionality without being bereft of his otherness. Merleau Ponty and Levinas! The enigma of the other is approached by Merleau Ponty and Levinas in different ways: while Merleau Ponty, especially in his later writings, tries to deepen the experience to the extent that the invisible can be found within the visible, and the untouchable within the touchable, i.e. through the concept of reversibility, for Levinas the other remains in his transcendence. From Levinas’ perspective, Merleau-Ponty’s embodied subject still grasps the other as a phenomenon, albeit not in a full
but a perspectival grasp. Within the subject’s horizon of body and extended sedimentation of culture and language, the other is assimilated to the same.

Nevertheless, much has been written to show that Merleau-Ponty refused the reduction of the “Other” to the “Same,” and that a sense of alterity does run through his writings. (Johnson and Smith, 1990; Busch, 1992; Hatley et al., 2006). Through dialogue, the Merleau-Pontyian subjects become aware of each other, there is true reciprocity; one lends and draws from the other.

Furthermore: Merleau-Ponty’s entire approach has been re-evaluated by Bernhard Waldenfels (Waldenfels, 2006) as an implicitly ethical initiative, very close to that of Levinas. Waldenfels shows that in both Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, the genesis of subjectivity itself includes responsibility. He claims that responsibility is embedded in the initial structure of Merleau-Ponty’s responsiveness.

**Conclusion: An Ethical Disposition for Architecture**

The three cornerstones for an ethically oriented architectural disposition meet the pre-requisites, but do not form a unified platform for ethical creativity because they are irreconcilable. Although there are major affinities, the “I-other” relationships vary in their most basic essence. The very meaning of the ethical varies, and at the same time, all three meanings are needed.

Architecture is not a philosophy and, therefore, irreconcilability is not a logical deficiency. Architecture is poiesis - the making of things: material or virtual, conceptual or real. It is interfering with the world and with others and contributing to the transformation of the world. It is agency.

If an architect is to create - his subjectivity, the root of his creativity, must retain a dimension of freedom. Therefore, the ethical disposition for architecture must include a self-constituting subject (Husserl), at least partially. To be ethical, the architect must be a sensible subject (Levinas) and a responsive subject (Merleau-Ponty). Both sensibility and responsiveness however, are passive. Creating is active. Architectural poiesis must therefore be embedded in the agent’s self-reassurance of his potential to contribute to a better future through conscious and intentional acts. At the same time, it must be rooted in the pre-conscious, the embodied, and the indecipherable, that which is forever a wonder. The agent is at the same time a sensible subject (Levinas - primacy of heteronomy), an embodied and dialogical subject (Merleau-Ponty) and a conscious subject (Husserl and Kant - primacy of autonomy).

All three cornerstones are indispensable and irreconcilable. They can be accommodated only through a stratified or split platform (Fig. 2). Both stratified and split platforms maintain the irreconcilable. It was actually a phenomenological researcher of ethics, Nicolai Hartmann, who showed that axiological systems vary between those that include contradictory principles, and those which are absolutely harmonious. The proposed platform belongs to the former. Architectural acts as poiesis are always intended at particularities in their historicity. The substratum for such acts is never exhausted in any specific act, but is rather an
array of possibilities, used to fuel the creative imagination towards acts that are actual and contextual compromises. As such they constitute a negotiation among various irreconcilables. Therefore, there is no need to reconcile the three cornerstones of the proposed disposition.

The ethical platform of architecture hereby proposed is an inclination, a disposition present before any specific act of intentionality. It is not a deep structure to be revealed in the self. Although necessarily rooted in the deep structure of subjective experience, which is in itself a relation of responsibility and responsiveness to the other, architectural disposition must be nurtured and nourished in the process of architectural education - when the architectural subject is emerging. Such education is a web of intentional acts, which, through conscious efforts, mean to saturate the budding architects with reflective as well as pre-reflective ethicality.
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International Publications.


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The author has been preoccupied with this approach in the recent years. Other versions of this paper have been published in Aravot, Iris (edit.) Proceedings of the International

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